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Abstract
Trade economists traditionally study the effect of lower variable trade costs. While in-
creasingly important politically, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) have received less atten-
tion. Viewing TBTs as fixed regulatory costs related to the entry into export markets, we
use a model with heterogeneous firms, trade in differentiated goods, and variable external
economies of scale to sort out the rich interactions between TBT reform, input diversity,
firm-level productivity, and aggregate productivity. We calibrate the model for 14 industries
in order to clarify the theoretical ambiguities. Overall, our results tend to suggest beneficial
effects of TBT reform but also reveal interesting sectoral variation.
Keywords: Heterogeneous firms, international trade, single European market, technical bar-
riers to trade, regulatory costs.
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1 Introduction
In the last fifty years, import duties on most relevant manufacturing goods have fallen substan-
tially. A rising fraction of total trade is covered by free trade agreements and is therefore exempt
from tariffs. Yet, even within the European Union only about 10% of total spending falls on
products from other EU15 countries (Delgado, 2006). Chen (2004) explains this striking fact
i.a. by the existence of technical barriers to trade (TBTs). TBTs impose additional export mar-
ket access costs. Exporters must customize their goods to meet the import country’s technical
norms, its health, safety, or environmental norms, and must undergo costly product labeling
and conformity assessment procedures.
Both the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) acknowledge that
TBTs may serve a multitude of legitimate goals; however, regulation that effectively protects
incumbent domestic firms against foreign competition is deemed discriminatory and is therefore
illegal. Within the context of the Single Market Programme (SMP), the EU champions mutual
recognition of technical standards.1 However, Ilzkovitz, Dierx, Kovacs, and Sousa (2007) argue
that while about 20% of industrial production and about 26% of intra EU manufacturing trade
are covered by mutual recognition, “practical implementation [...] is often hampered by legal
uncertainty, administrative hassle and lack of awareness both from the side of the companies
and of the Member States’ authorities” (p. 61).
Progress in dismantling TBTs has been slow. The number of TBT-related complaints notified
to the WTO has grown from 365 in 1995 to almost 900 in 2006 (WTO, 2007). Similarly, Conway,
Janod, and Nicoletti (2005) document the persistence of discriminatory regulation in the OECD.
According to the Fraser Institute, the stringency of regulatory barriers to trade has increased
in many EU countries from 1995-2005 (see Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel, and Leeson, 2007). TBT
related issues are increasingly important in trade negotiations. Indeed, harmonizing standards
1The principle of mutual recognition mandates that a product lawfully marketed in one EU country should be
allowed to be sold in any other EU country even when the product does not fully comply with the technical rules in
the destination country. However, countries can refuse market access for public safety, health, and environmental
reasons (Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty; similar regulation appears in the WTO TBT Agreement in Article
2.)
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and rules rather than abolishing tariffs and quotas are “the real 21st century trade issues”
(Pascal Lamy).2
Despite the importance of TBTs, the theoretical literature has usually focused on variable
trade costs such as transportation costs or tariffs. In this paper, we model TBT liberalization as
a reduction in the fixed regulatory costs of foreign market access. We study two scenarios. In the
first, the reduction of regulatory burdens on importers is accompanied by domestic deregulation
such that the implicit protection of domestic firms, T, is unchanged. We call this situation T-
neutral deregulation. In the second scenario, regulatory requirements imposed on importers are
reduced while those on domestic firms remain unchanged. We call this case incremental mutual
recognition, since it leads towards a situation of full mutual recognition where meeting domestic
regulation is enough to access foreign markets. Both scenarios are relevant empirically.
We analyze these two scenarios in a model of international trade in differentiated goods with
heterogeneous firms. Out setup is essentially the one of Melitz (2003), with the difference that
we focus on aggregate productivity (not welfare) and allow for variable degrees of external scale
economies in the final good production function (as Egger and Kreickemeier, 2007). We do this,
because recent literature (e.g., Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti, 2007) has established how impor-
tant the size of the scale effect is as a major determinant of the qualitative and quantitative
implications of trade liberalization. Moreover, empirical work points towards substantial indus-
try variance and generally rejects the implicit numerical choice of the scale effect parameter
embodied in the traditional formulation of the Melitz (and, indeed, most Krugman (1980)-
type trade models). As many other authors,3 we work with a specific productivity distribution
(Pareto) to sort out ambiguities and to parameterize the model for simulation purposes.
In the proposed framework, TBT reform affects the equilibrium input diversity (i.e., the
mass of imported and domestic varieties) available in an industry, which affects the productivity
of final goods producers through an external effect. TBT reform also modifies the equilibrium
productivity distribution of input producers and, hence, their average productivity. These two
2EU and Asean to pave way for trade pact talks, Financial Times, 7 September 2004. At that time, Lamy was
EU trade commissioner. He is now Director-General of the WTO.
3Egger and Kreickemeier (2007), Baldwin and Forslid (2006), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), etc.
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forces determine the effect on industry productivity, with their relative importance given by the
external scale elasticity.
Incremental mutual recognition changes the extensive margin of firm behavior; i.e., it mod-
ifies the selection of input producers into exporting and domestic sales.4 It also affects the
intensive margin, as additional competitive pressure lowers sales per firm. The two effects lead
to reallocation of resources towards medium-productivity new exporters, away from the upper
and lower areas of the productivity distribution. The net reallocation effect that drives average
productivity of input producers depends on the relative importance of these two countervailing
reallocation effects. Also the effect on input variety is theoretically unclear. It depends on indus-
try characteristics; e.g., on the degree of productivity dispersion. It is therefore not surprising
that the total effect of TBT reform on industry productivity is a complicated function of model
parameters. The contribution of this paper is to analytically sort out those ambiguities.
The theoretical analysis has a couple of interesting implications. First, it may rationalize
the low robustness of a positive relationship between trade openness and economic growth (see
Rodr´ıguez and Rodrik, 2000). Both variable and fixed cost trade liberalization lead to a higher
volume of trade, thereby increasing openness. However, for similar parameter constellation,
the former unambiguously improves productivity while the latter does not. Second, our paper
suggests that the productivity effect of lower variable trade costs is importantly conditioned by
the existence of fixed costs protection. Indeed, if TBTs are too high, lower transportation costs
may turn out to lower industry productivity.
We offer an industry-by-industry calibration exercise in order to numerically validate whether
the conditions hold under which TBT reform improves aggregate outcomes. In this local analysis,
TBT reform turns out to reduce the productivity of the average input supplier. However, the
increase in input variety more than compensates those losses, so that industry productivity
improves. We also simulate the model and compare the status quo with a situation where
technical requirements are harmonized across countries. This being a global exercise and the
4The selection effects rely on firm heterogeneity. Firms select themselves into exporting according to their
productivity. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that this is indeed the case, see the survey by Helpman
(2006).
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effects of TBT reform being non-linear, it turns out that not all industries (e.g., machinery)
gain from the reform. Many do gain, but only very modestly, while others experience massive
productivity improvements (e.g., 35% in the case of scientific equipment).
Our paper is related to a number of studies, many of them inspired by the Single Mar-
ket Programme. Using a partial equilibrium framework, Smith and Venables (1988) simulate
the abolishment of trade barriers in terms of tariff equivalents between European countries.
Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996) simulate the general equilibrium growth and welfare effects of
lower variable trade costs in a multi-sector Krugman-type model, where scale economies play an
important role. A similar simulation is done by Francois, Meijl, and van Tongeren (2005). The
latter authors imulate a simultaneous cut in tariffs and TBTs, and obtain a real income gain of
0.3% to 0.5% of global GDP, depending on the country coverage.
The older literature uses models with homogeneous firms and studies the effects of lower
variable trade costs. More recently, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2007) and Corcos, Del
Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2007) focus on the productivity effects of intra-EU variable trade
costs reduction under quasi-linear preferences with heterogeneous firms and provide simulation
results. Our paper differs, since we use the Melitz (2003) model as a point of departure and
relate TBT to fixed costs of market access.
Baldwin and Forslid (2006) provide an excellent discussion of trade policy in the standard
Melitz (2003) model. They also address lower market access costs and discuss the implication
for the trade volume. Our paper differs from theirs in that it sorts out the intricate implications
of TBT reform on industry productivity. Moreover, we allow for variable degrees of external
scale economies and offer a calibration exercise.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the analytical
framework and solves for general equilibrium. Chapter 3 theoretically derives conditions under
which TBT reform increases productivity, and Chapter 4 calibrates the model in order to validate
these conditions for different industries. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
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2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Demand for inputs
We study a single market (such as the EU) with n + 1 identical countries. Each country is
populated by a representative consumer who has symmetric Cobb-Douglas preferences for final
consumption goods produced by H industries. Final output producers in each industry h are
perfectly competitive. They assemble their output using a continuum of inputs q(ω) according
to the same constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function
yh =M
ηh−1
σh−1
h
 ∫
ω∈Ωh
q (ω)
σh−1
σh dω

σh
σh−1
, σh > 1, ηh ≥ 0. (1)
The set Ωh represents the mass of available inputs in industry h, and σh is the elasticity of
substitution between any two varieties in that industry. Mh is the measure of Ωh and denotes
the degree of input diversity (the number of available differentiated inputs). Expression (1) is
analogous to the traditional CES production function for ηh = 1.5 For ηh = 0, there are no
external economies of scale. In the standard treatments of the Melitz (2003) or the Krugman
(1980) models, the implicit choice of ηh = 1 links the effect of input diversity on output directly
to the elasticity of substitution σh. Recent empirical work finds that ηh < 1, rejecting the
standard formulation (Ardelean, 2007).
The optimal demand quantity for each input ω is
q (ω) =
(
p (ω)
Ph
)−σh Rh/Ph
M
1−ηh
h
, (2)
where Rh is aggregate industry spending on inputs, p(ω) is the price charged by an input
producer to the final output producers, and
Ph =M
− ηh−1
σh−1
h
 ∫
ω∈Ωh
p (ω)1−σh dω

1
1−σh
(3)
5The generalization is already discussed in the working paper version of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) paper and
has been revived by Benassy (1996). Variants of it have been adopted by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Egger
and Kreickemeier (2007), Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007), or Felbermayr and Prat (2007).
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is the price index dual to (1). Clearly, demand for variety ω is larger the smaller the price p (ω)
relative to the average price of competing varieties Ph, and the larger real spending Rh/Ph.
Higher input diversity Mh affects demand through two channels: indirectly, through its effect
on the price level, and, if ηh 6= 1, directly, through the reduction of relevant real spending
(Rh/Ph) /M
1−ηh
h on each variety ω.Markups over marginal costs are constant in this framework;
nevertheless we find it useful to call Mh a competition effect.
2.2 Production of inputs
Differentiated inputs are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms. Each
industry draws on a single industry-specific factor Lh, which is inelastically supplied in equal
quantities to all industries in all countries. Industry specificity of factors and the Cobb-Douglas
utility function make sure that trade reforms generate only within rather than between-industry
resource reallocation.
Input producers differ with respect to their productivity index ϕ; in the following we use
this index instead of ω to identify firms.6 They share the same domestic and foreign market
entry costs, fdh and f
x
h , and the same iceberg variable trade costs τh ≥ 1. All fixed costs have
to be incurred in terms of the industry-specific factor. Th ≡ fxh/fdh measures the competitive
disadvantage of imported relative to domestically produced inputs. To ensure the existence of
the selection effect (and in line with empirical evidence) we assume τσh−1h Th > 1.
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that firms are ex ante identical but face uncertainty
regarding their productivity ϕ. They learn about ϕ only after sinking the entry cost feh. Not all
of those entrants turn out to be productive enough to bear the domestic fixed costs fdh . Hence,
they remain inactive. Firms with intermediate productivity sell on the domestic market, but
cannot recover the additional fixed costs associated to foreign sales, fxh . The most productive
firms are active on all markets. Under the assumption τσh−1h Th > 1, there exist threshold
productivity levels 0 < ϕ∗h < (ϕ
x
h)
∗, which partition the distribution of input producers into
6This is possible because, in equilibrium, each input is produced by one firm only and the distribution of ϕ is
assumed to have no mass points.
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inactive firms, purely domestic ones, and exporters.
We characterize the ex ante productivity distribution by the Pareto.7 The c.d.f. is Gh (ϕ) =
1−ϕ−γh with support on [1,∞), where the shape parameter γh > σh−1 controls the dispersion
of the distribution.8. Larger values of γh characterize industries in which the productivity
distribution is skewed towards inefficient input producers. We can then write the probability
that a given entrant (that has just paid the entry fee feh) starts production by p
in
h = 1−G (ϕ∗h) =
(ϕ∗h)
−γh . Analogously, pxh =
1−G[(ϕxh)
∗]
1−G(ϕ∗h)
= [ϕ∗h/ (ϕ
x
h)
∗]γh is the ex-ante (and ex-post) probability
that one of these successful entrants will export.
Input producers have linear production functions q(ϕ) = ϕlh(ϕ), where lh(ϕ) denotes the
employment of the industry-h specific factor in firm ϕ. Profit maximization of input producers
results in the standard rule for determining the ex-factory (f.o.b.) price, i.e. ph (ϕ) = wh/ (ρhϕ),
where ρh = 1 − 1/σh. Since the description of technology (1) is identical over all countries, we
may pick the factor price specific to some industry, wh, as the numeraire. In the following, we
focus on that industry.
Optimal demand (2) and the pricing rule of input producers imply that revenues earned on
the domestic market are given by
rdh (ϕ) = Rh (Phρhϕ)
σh−1 /M1−ηhh . (4)
By symmetry, producers who find it optimal to sell to a foreign market generate revenues of
rh (ϕ) = rdh (ϕ)
(
1 + nτ1−σh
)
. In turn, profits from selling domestically and exporting to one
foreign market are respectively given by
pidh (ϕ) = r
d
h (ϕ) /σh − fdh , (5)
pixh (ϕ) = τ
1−σ
h r
d
h (ϕ) /σh − fdhTh. (6)
7This assumption is not necessary for many properties of the model; see Melitz (2003). However, it allows to
understand the importance of industry dispersion to sort out the potentially ambiguous effects of various forms
of trade liberalization on industry productivity. The Pareto has been used, i.a., by Melitz, Helpman, and Yeaple
(2004), Baldwin and Forslid (2006) or Egger and Kreickemeier (2007). It fits well empirically, see Axtell (2001)
or Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2007).
8The assumption γh > σh − 1 makes sure that the equilibrium sales distribution converges.
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2.3 Industry aggregation
The productivity of final output producers (industry productivity) depends on input diversity
(the number of available inputs), and on the average productivity level of input producers. Input
diversity has a domestic and an imported component: Mh =Mdh +nM
x
h , where n is the number
of identical import (and, by symmetry: export) markets. Since Mxh = p
x
hM
d
h , one can express
Mh as Mh =Mdh (1 + np
x
h) .
The average productivity level of domestic input producers, ϕ˜dh, is defined as the mean over
sales-weighted productivities of all active producers.9 Using the Pareto assumption,
(
ϕ˜dh
)σh−1
=
∫∞
ϕ∗h
ϕσh−1dGh (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗h) = γhγh − (σh − 1) (ϕ∗h)σh−1 . (7)
Equation (7) shows that the endogenously determined entry cutoff productivity level ϕ∗h shapes
the average productivity of domestically produced inputs. The average over exporters, ϕ˜xh, is
constructed analogously, and crucially depends on the export cutoff productivity level (ϕxh)
∗ .
Given perfect symmetry across countries, the average productivity of inputs used in produc-
tion of the final good, ϕ˜h, is
(ϕ˜h)
σh−1 =
1
1 + npxh
(
ϕ˜dh
)σh−1
+
npxh
1 + npxh
(
ϕ˜xh
τh
)σh−1
, (8)
where productivities of foreign firms are adjusted for iceberg transportation costs τh and average
productivities of domestic and imported varieties are weighted by their respective shares in total
input diversity.
The weighting in (8) implies that q (ϕ˜h) = RhM
− ηh+σh−1
σh−1
h /Ph. In ηh = 0 (i.e., in the absence
of industry externalities), the output of the average firm is equal to average output Rh/ (PhMh) .
Similarly, applying (8) to the industry price index (3), one has Ph = M
− ηh
σh−1
h p (ϕ˜h) . Hence, if
ηh = 0, the price index is equal to the price chosen by the average firm.
Using optimal pricing of inputs in Ph and recognizing that aggregate productivity Ah = 1/Ph,
we are now ready to write the level of aggregate industry productivity as a function of average
9See Melitz (2003), p. 1700.
9
productivity and input diversity
Ah = ρϕ˜hM
ηh
σh−1
h . (9)
Industry productivity10 increases as ρ goes up so that markups and the amount of resources used
for fixed costs are lower. Industry productivity is directly proportional to average productivity of
input producers ϕ˜h. It depends positively on input diversityMh as long as ηh is strictly positive.
The term ηhσh−1 is the elasticity of industry productivity with respect to input diversity.
11 The
aim of the subsequent analysis is to understand how Ah changes with different types of TBT
reform. To do this, we need to endogenize ϕ˜ and Mh. Typically, TBT liberalization moves these
two components of industry productivity in opposite directions. Hence, the elasticity ηhσh−1 will
play a crucial role.
2.4 General equilibrium
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium values of Mh and ϕ˜h. The discussion is deliberately
brief, since it is close to Melitz (2003) and to Baldwin and Forslid (2006); the only difference
comes through ηh 6= 1. Equilibrium is determined by four conditions.
Zero cutoff profit (ZCP) conditions. The domestic ZCP condition identifies the firm ϕ∗h
that is indifferent between selling domestically and remaining inactive; the foreign ZCP condition
locates the firm (ϕxh)
∗ that is indifferent between selling domestically and also selling on the n
symmetric foreign markets. Formally, the ZCPs are
pidh (ϕ
∗
h) = 0, pi
x
h [(ϕ
x
h)
∗] = 0. (10)
Using the profit functions derived in (5) and (6), the zero cutoff profit conditions imply that
rdh (ϕ
∗
h) = σhf
d
h and r
d
h [(ϕ
x
h)
∗] = σhfdhτ
σh−1
h Th. Then (4) links the export cutoff (ϕ
x
h)
∗ and the
10This is the ideal measure of industry productivity. Measuring productivity empirically is not trivial (see
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Gibson (2006) points out that productivity effects induced by Melitz (2003)-type
reallocation of market shares within industries are not reflected by data-based measures of productivities, (e.g.,
value added per worker).
11If ηh = 1, (9) is formally equivalent to the expression describing total welfare in Melitz (2003).
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domestic entry entry cutoff ϕ∗h
12
(ϕxh)
∗ = ϕ∗hτhT
1
σh−1
h . (11)
Moreover, using the definition of ϕ˜dh (7) and the condition linking the two cutoff productivities
(11), one can link the average productivity of domestic firms with those of exporters
ϕ˜xh = τhT
1
σh−1
h ϕ˜
d
h. (12)
It follows from (11) that the probability of exporting conditional on successful entry is given by
pxh = τ
−γh
h T
− γh
σh−1
h . (13)
Our results so far allow to express average productivity ϕ˜h, as defined in (8), by using (12)
ϕ˜h = ϕ˜
d
h
(
1 + npxhTh
1 + npxh
) 1
σh−1
. (14)
Both the domestic and the foreign market ZCPs can be combined and graphed in (ϕ∗h, p¯ih)−space
by using the definition of average profits (defined over active firms, ex post perspective) p¯ih =
pidh
(
ϕ˜dh
)
+npxxpi
x
h (ϕ˜
x
h) and noting that ϕ˜
d
h and ϕ˜
x
h are both functions of ϕ
∗
h. It is well known that,
given the Pareto assumption, average profits p¯ih do not depend on ϕ∗h.
13
Free entry. The free entry condition ensures that expected profits (from the ex ante perspec-
tive) cover entry costs feh :
pinh p¯ih
δh
= feh, (15)
where δh is the exogenous Poisson exit rate of producers and pinh = (ϕ
∗
h)
−γh is the likelihood that
a random productivity draw allows a producer to at least break even on the domestic market.
Clearly, this free entry condition defines an upward-sloping relationship between p¯ih and ϕ∗h.
Equating that condition with the combined ZCP condition discussed above, one can determine
the entry cutoff productivity level ϕ∗h as a function of exogenous variables only
14
ϕ∗h =
[
σh − 1
γh − (σh − 1)
fdh
δhf
e
h
(1 + npxhTh)
] 1
γh
. (16)
12Derivations of analytical results are detailed in the Appendix.
13See, e.g., Baldwin and Forslid (2006).
14Noting that (13) relates pxh to exogenous variables.
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Substituting ϕ∗h into the definition of the domestic average productivity (7) one can determine
ϕ˜dh. Finally, using (13) and (14) allows to compute the average productivity defined over all
input producers, ϕ˜h. Note that the above analysis has not used any factor market clearing
condition; ϕ˜h is therefore independent from Lh. Moreover, when solving for ϕ˜h, input diversity
is irrelevant. Input diversity Mh can be found recursively, i.e., given ϕ˜h.
Stationarity condition. The fourth equilibrium condition allows to pin down input diversity.
In a stationary equilibrium, in any country, the mass of successful entrants pinh M
e
h must equal
the mass of producers hit by the exit shock δhMdh . Hence,
pinh M
e
h = δhM
d
h . (17)
As shown in Melitz (2003, p. 1704), under stationarity, aggregate revenue Rh is fixed by the
size of Lh (and the normalization of the h−factor price). This determines downs equilibrium
input diversity by Mh = Rh/rd (ϕ˜h) . Using the zero cutoff profit conditions (10), we obtain
equilibrium industry diversity
Mh =
Lh
σhf
d
h
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ˜h
)σh−1
. (18)
3 Industry productivity effects of TBT reform
Totally differentiating industry productivity (9) yields
Aˆh =
ηh
σh − 1Mˆh +
̂˜ϕh. (19)
We use the conventional ‘hat’ notation to denote an infinitesimally small deviation of a variable
from its initial level (xˆ = dx/x). Any type of trade liberalization has potential implications for
the cutoff productivity levels ϕ∗h and (ϕ
x
h)
∗ , and hence for productivity averages of domestic and
international firms, ϕ˜dh and ϕ˜
x
h, respectively. The productivity level of the average firm ϕ˜h is
a weighted average over domestic and international firms, with the relative weights potentially
being affected by TBT reform, too. Different trade liberalization scenarios may have similar
effects on cutoff productivities (the extensive margin); yet, they may lead to drastically different
12
patterns of inter-industry resource reallocation along the intensive margin, and, hence, different
results for industry productivity. The literature has not fully recognized this point yet.
Input diversity adjusts to changes in the entry cutoff ϕ˜h and average productivity ϕ∗h such
that factor markets clear (see equation (18)). For the assessment of industry productivity, both
effects need to be combined, with the elasticity ηh/ (σh − 1) playing a crucial role. Hence,
the overall effect of TBT reform on industry productivity works through a number of different
mechanisms and is likely to be ambiguous theoretically. In the extreme case where ηh = 0
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003), (19) simplifies substantially as variation in input diversity
has no bearing on industry productivity. Also the case where ηh = 1, typically studied in the
literature, turns out offer more clear-cut results. In this special case ((19)) is formally isomorphic
to the description of welfare in the Melitz (2003) model. The contribution of the present paper
is to discuss the empirically relevant situation where ηh ∈ (0, 1) and to focus on TBT reform
rather than on the more widely studied case of variable trade cost liberalization.
We assume that fixed market costs fdh and f
x
h have two components: fixed distribution
costs, f¯dh and f¯
x
h , and fixed regulatory costs, f˜
d
h and f˜
x
h , that relate to approval and conformity
assessment costs. The latter is set by national authorities, but differs from a tax since it does not
generate revenue. We define as a TBT reform any policy measure that reduces regulatory costs
for foreign firms f˜xh . Hence, harmonization of standards, i.e., f˜
d
h = f˜
x
h , need not be a TBT reform.
Full-fledged mutual recognition of standards, in contrast, would make licensing procedures for
imported varieties redundant, hence f˜xh = 0. Only in this case do TBTs disappear entirely.
We consider two scenarios of TBT reform. In the first, policy makers lower the burden on
foreign firms f˜xh , but also adjust regulatory costs for domestic firms f˜
d
h such that the competitive
disadvantage of foreign firms, Th, remains unchanged. We term this case T-neutral deregulation.
In the second scenario, f˜xh is reduced, while f˜
d
h remains fixed. Any marginal reduction in f˜
x
h
brings the economy closer to the ideal situation of full mutual recognition. Hence, we call
our second scenario incremental mutual recognition. Throughout, we assume that distribution-
related fixed costs are such that the partitioning of firms into exporters and purely domestic
firms is maintained (i.e. f¯xh/f
d
h > τ
1−σh
h ).
15
15Deregulation of entry costs (feh) is beyond the scope of this paper. Lower entry costs induce additional
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3.1 T-neutral deregulation
In this scenario, fxh and f
d
h both fall, but Th remains constant. Therefore, the export probability
pxh (13), which depends on fixed market access costs only through Th, is fixed. It is also clear, that
the domestic ϕ∗h and the export cutoff productivity levels (ϕ
x
h)
∗ move proportionally (see (11)).
To understand the effect of T-neutral deregulation, note that ϕ∗h is determined in (ϕ
∗
h, p¯ih)−space
by the intersection of the ZCP condition and the free entry condition. In the present context,
the first is a horizontal line, while the latter is upward-sloping. Domestic deregulation does not
affect the free entry locus. However, the ZPC condition shifts downwards, so that ϕ∗h falls. The
reasoning is as follows. The ZCP locus summarizes combinations of p¯ih and ϕ∗h for which the
marginal firm ϕ∗h just breaks even. When fixed costs f
d
h fall, the firm starts to make profits. To
restore zero profits, the firm’s revenue has to fall. This is achieved by tighter competition: either
relative prices have to increase or residual demand has to drop. This is however not limited to
firm ϕ∗h; profits fall for all firms; hence p¯ih goes down.
The effect on the cutoff productivities at hand, one can now use Figure 1 to gain some
intuition on the reallocation of market shares that domestic deregulation entails. The figure
shows sales rh (ϕ) per firm as a function of productivity. This locus is upward-sloping as more
efficient firms have higher sales (given σ > 1). Since total sales Rh are pinned down by Lh, rh can
be read as a measure of market share. The sales function changes with T-neutral deregulation.16
Due to the increase in the number of traded varieties, competition goes up, which means that
incumbent exporters and domestic-only firms lose market share (intensive margin).
Since domestic and foreign market entry costs fall in proportion, the probability of exporting,
given successful entry, does not change (see equation (13)). Moreover, the entry cutoff levels
shift proportionally. Hence, the reallocation of market shares towards less productive firms
directly translates into a decrease in average productivity. We shall discuss the effect on average
entry, which increases competition and reduces realized profits, resulting in a (proportional) shift of the cutoff
productivity levels to the right and an increase in average productivity (see Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2005,
and Felbermayr and Prat, 2007, in slightly different settings).
16Figure 2 in Melitz (2003) which studies the reallocation of market shares as an economy moves from autarky
to trade. Our Figure 1 is similar, but studies incremental trade liberalization.
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Figure 1: Within-industry reallocation of market shares as response to T-neutral deregulation.
productivity, input diversity, and industry productivity in more detail below.
Average productivity of input producers. The change in average productivity is com-
pletely driven by the change in the entry cutoff productivity level, i.e.̂˜ϕh/fˆdh = ϕˆ∗h/fˆdh (see (14)
and (7)). Totally differentiating (16) yields17
̂˜ϕh
fˆdh
=
1
γh
> 0. (20)
Thus, average productivity declines in response to T-neutral deregulation. The parameter γh
is inversely related to the degree of productivity dispersion (heterogeneity) in the industry. In
the extreme case where γh → ∞, all firms are identical and there cannot be any selection or
reallocation effect (as long as all firms remain exporters or purely domestic). The room of
reallocation is bigger as γh is smaller and industry heterogeneity is larger. It is therefore natural
that the effect of T-neutral deregulation on average productivity is larger the smaller γh.
17Recall that changes in the regulatory component directly translate into changes in total market access costs,
i.e. fˆdh =
b
f˜
d
h
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Input diversity. As argued above, lowering fixed market entry costs attracts new input pro-
ducers to start production and makes it profitable for additional firms to export. The change
in input diversity is given by Mˆh = −fˆdh + (σh − 1)
(
ϕˆ∗h − ̂˜ϕh) < 0. In the present scenario, the
entry cutoff productivity level ϕˆ∗h and average productivity ̂˜ϕh move proportionally. Hence, the
elasticity of input diversity with respect to fdh is
Mˆh
fˆdh
= −1. (21)
Industry productivity. The industry productivity effect combines the input diversity effect
and the effect on input producers’ productivity. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (T-neutral deregulation) Industry productivity only increases in response to
T-neutral deregulation, if the degree of external economies of scale is larger than the inverse
dispersion measure of the Pareto
ηh
σh − 1 >
1
γh
. (22)
Proof. Follows from using (20) and (21) in (19).
Hence, the elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to input diversity has to be
sufficiently large in order to overcompensate the loss in average productivity. Note that, in the
case of ηh ≥ 1, the above inequality always holds (by the regularity condition γh > σh − 1).
Hence, domestic deregulation always makes the final goods producer more productive. However,
this result is not general: in the empirically relevant case, where ηh < 1, the industry productivity
effect is ambiguous.
3.2 Incremental mutual recognition
This scenario implies a reduction of Th with fdh held constant. Consider again the determination
of the domestic cutoff productivity ϕ∗h in (ϕ
∗
h, p¯ih)−space. The free entry condition does not
change as Th falls. However, the ZPC condition now shifts up, so that ϕ∗h goes up. The
marginal domestic producer is not an exporter; hence there is no direct effect of the reduction in
fxh . However, the entry of foreign importers makes competition tougher, revenue per firm goes
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Figure 2: Within-industry reallocation of market shares as response to incremental mutual
recognition.
down, and the ϕ∗h firm starts to make losses. To restore zero profits, there must be an upwards
adjustment of p¯ih. The number of competitors or their average productivity (or both) have to
go down.
Hence, ϕ∗h increases while (ϕ
x
h)
∗ goes down. Figure 1 provides some intuition on the re-
allocation of market shares: the emergence of new exporters causes a loss of market share to
incumbent exporters and domestic firms. Since new exporters are firms with medium levels of
productivity, the net effect on average productivity is ambiguous.
Average productivity of input producers. ϕ˜h only increases in response to a cut in Th if
the shape parameter γh is large enough. The intuition is straightforward: The larger the shape
parameter γh, the more mass is given to low productive firms, thus giving a high potential for
reallocation from fairly unproductive, exiting firms to new exporters.
If the initial level of competitive disadvantage of importers is already smaller than 1, there is
almost no export selection effect, and ϕ˜h never increases in response to a TBT reform regardless
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of the shape parameter γh. We may summarize the result in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Average productivity) Fix fdh and reduce Th. Average productivity ϕ˜h increases
in response to incremental mutual recognition if and only if the the dispersion measure of the
Pareto distribution is large enough, i.e.̂˜ϕh
Tˆh
< 0⇔ 1
γh
<
1
γ
h
≡ 1
σh − 1
√
1
1 + npxh
Th − 1
Th
(23)
Proof. Follows immediately from totally differentiating (14).
At the extensive margin, the least productive firms are forced to exit (selection effect), while
new exporters enter (adverse export selection effect). Only if the selection effect is large enough
as compared to the adverse selection effect, ϕ˜h rises as stated in condition (23).
Input diversity. If the productivity distribution is not extremely skewed towards the least
productive firms (i.e. if the shape parameter γh is sufficiently small), the number of input
varieties lost through exposure to trade is overcompensated by additionally imported inputs,
resulting in an increase in input diversity.
Lemma 2 (Input diversity) Fix fdh and reduce Th. Input diversity Mh increases in response
to incremental mutual recognition if and only if the dispersion measure of the Pareto γh is
sufficiently small, i.e.
Mˆh
Tˆh
< 0⇔ 1
γh
>
1
γ¯h
≡ 1
σh − 1
1
1 + npxh
Th − 1
Th
. (24)
Proof. Follows immediately from totally differentiating (18).
Lemma 2 presents a necessary condition (24). Note that a simple sufficient condition is
Th < 1.
Industry productivity. Using (19) and Lemmata 1 and 2, average productivity and input
diversity increase in response to a incremental mutual recognition, if the value γh is not too
extreme, i.e., if
γ¯h > γh > γh. (25)
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Then, industry productivity improves unambiguously regardless the degree of external economies
of scale.
However, even if condition (25) is violated, industry productivity can actually increase,
depending on the degree of external economies of scale. If ϕ˜h is falling andMh rising, the degree
of external economies of scale has to be sufficiently large for industry productivity to increase,
and vice versa. There exists the following trade-off: If the shape parameter γh is sufficiently
small unproductive firms have little relative mass. Hence, there is little potential for reallocation
from the exiting, low-productivity firms to new exporters. Then average productivity declines.
In contrast, input diversity increases, since more imported varieties are attracted than domestic
ones are forced to exit. If, on the other hand, the shape parameter is γh is sufficiently large, the
logic reverses, and average productivity increases whereas input diversity declines.
Consider that input diversity decreases in response to incremental mutual recognition, which
means a violation of condition (24) in Lemma 2. Then, by condition (23) average productivity
unambiguously rises, and the degree of external economies of scale has to be sufficiently small.
The negative diversity effect is always offset for the empirically relevant cases ηh ≤ 1.
Turn now to the case where average productivity declines in response to incremental mutual
recognition, i.e. a violation of condition (23) in Lemma 1. Then, by (24) industry diversity
always increases, and ηh/ (σh − 1) has to be sufficiently large to generate an increase in industry
productivity, which is always true for the special Melitz case (ηh = 1). These results are
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 (Incremental mutual recognition) Let υ∗h be the threshold degree of external
economies of scale
υ∗h ≡
1
γh − γ¯h
(
γh
σh − 1 −
γ¯h
γh
)
.
(i) Violation of condition (24). A decrease in input diversity in response to incremental mutual
recognition is overcompensated by an increase in average productivity, if and only if the degree
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of external economies of scale is below the threshold value υ∗h, i.e.
ηh
σh − 1 < υ
∗
h, (26)
where υ∗h > 1/ (σh − 1) .
(ii) Violation of condition (23). A decrease in average productivity in response to incremental
mutual recognition is overcompensated by an increase in input diversity, if and only if the degree
of external economies of scale is above the threshold value υ∗h, i.e.
ηh
σh − 1 > υ
∗
h, (27)
where 0 < υ∗h < 1/ (σh − 1) .
Proof. The conditions follow from equation (19).
3.3 Comparing lower variable trade costs and TBT reform
As with incremental mutual recognition, lower variable trade costs induce an upward-shift in
the ZCP. The reason for this effect is the same as before. Hence, tariff liberalization (or any
reduction in variable trade costs) has similar effects on the cutoff productivity levels as lower
Th with fdh fixed. However, lower trade costs on net benefit incumbent exporters, as additional
competitive pressure is over-compensated by lower trade costs.18 It follows, that the direction
of market share reallocation is unequivocally towards more productive firms. Note, however,
that the sales function depicted in Figure 3 does not suffice to determine the effect on average
productivity, which depends on the masses of firms engaged in exporting relative to purely
domestic ones. It turns out that the productivity effect is a priori ambiguous and depends on
Th, which governs the size of the selection and export selection effect.
If Th > 1, imported inputs are on average more productive (they have to cover higher fixed
market entry costs). This implies lower prices and, in turn, given CES preferences, results in
higher expenditure. Thus, more than one domestically produced input has to be displaced in
18This result holds for all productivity distributions.
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Figure 3: Within-industry reallocation of market shares as response to variable trade cost lib-
eralization.
order to import one additional input variety, and input diversity drops.19 Reallocation of market
shares towards more productive firms and the reduced availability of the least productive inputs,
result in higher average productivity. If Th < 1, we end up with higher input diversity. It turns
out that in this case average productivity actually declines.20
For the empirical relevant case Th > 1, input diversity drops at the lower end of the produc-
tivity distribution, resulting in an increase in average productivity. As mentioned above, the
condition under which average productivity increases is less strict:
Lemma 3 (Average productivity) Average productivity increases in response to variable
trade cost liberalization if and only if the dispersion measure of the Pareto distribution is small
19A similar explanation has been put forward by Baldwin and Forslid (2006).
20Th > (<) 1 is a necessary condition for input diversity to decrease (rise), whereas for average productivity
to increase (drop) it is a sufficient condition. The necessary condition would be less strict and depend on the
skewness of the productivity distribution.
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enough, i.e. ̂˜ϕh
τˆh
< 0⇔ 1
γh
> − 1
σh − 1
1
1 + npxh
Th − 1
Th
. (28)
Proof. Follows from totally differentiating (14).
Condition (28) clearly holds if Mh decreases, i.e. Th > 1. However, average productivity
also rises if the selection effect is sufficiently large, shifting input production to more productive
firms.
Proposition 3 (Lower variable trade costs) Let ψ∗h be the threshold degree of external
economies of scale
ψ∗h ≡
1
σh − 1 +
1
γh
Th
Th − 1 (1 + np
x
h) .
(i) Assume Th > 1, so that input diversity decreases and average productivity increases. Then
industry productivity goes up if and only if the degree of external economies of scale is below the
threshold value ψ∗h, i.e.
ηh
σh − 1 < ψ
∗
h. (29)
(ii) Assume Th < 1 and a violation of condition (28), so that input diversity increases and
average productivity decreases. Then industry productivity increases if and only if the degree of
external economies of scale is above the threshold value ψ∗h, i.e.
ηh
σh − 1 > ψ
∗
h. (30)
Proof. The conditions follow from totally differentiating (18).
Conditions (29) and (30) always hold if respectively ηh ≤ 1, and ηh ≥ 1. Hence, in the
special Melitz case (ηh = 1), industry productivity always increases in response to variable trade
cost liberalization. In contrast, incremental mututal recognition reduces the market shares of
existing exporters, thereby inducing reallocation of market shares towards less productive firms,
and Th > 1 is not sufficient to guarantee an increase in average productivity.
There are three interesting corollaries that follow from the comparison between TBT reform
and variable trade cost reductions. First, in the empirically relevant case Th > 1 and ηh ≤ 1,
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lower variable trade costs unambiguously improves industry productivity, while the effect of
TBT reform is still ambiguous. However, in both situations, total export sales increase.21 Hence,
there is no clear link between increased trade openness and industry (or even economy-wide)
productivity measures. This theoretical result rationalizes the low degree of robustness that
empirical cross-country analyses of the openness-productivity (or more often: GDP per capita)
link suffer from; see, e.g., Rodr´ıguez and Rodrik (2000).
Second, the effect of lower trade costs is conditioned by the importance of competitive dis-
advantage of foreign firms as measured by Th. We have seen above, that – if Th > 1 – lower
variable trade costs may lead to a fall in industry productivity. In other words: industries can
be hurt by reductions in tariffs or transportation costs if the degree of fixed-cost protection is
too high. This allows two policy conclusions: first, before engaging in variable trade cost re-
forms, countries should lower TBTs. Only countries with sufficiently low TBTs benefit from the
(exogenous) downward trend in transportation costs. Hence, productivity gains from technical
progress in transportation can be tapped only if TBTS are low enough.
Third, there seems to be substantial resistance against TBT reforms. Gwartney, Lawson,
Sobel, and Leason (2007) argue that the EU25 countries have failed on average to decrease
regulatory costs to importers. Our paper allows two interpretations of this result. First, based
on efficiency considerations, TBT reform is not desirable per se, at least not under arbitrary
parameter constellations. Second, TBT reform – even if it leads to industry productivity gains
– inflicts losses to the vast majority of firms due to the implied reallocation of resources towards
new exporters – by nature a relatively small fraction out of all domestic firms. Hence, it may
not be overly surprising that total resistance against TBT reform is strong, and, in particu-
lar, stronger than against lower variable trade cost reductions, which tend to be beneficial for
incumbent exporters.
21Total sales abroad are given by Xcifh = nM
x
h r
x (ϕ˜xh) . Recall that M
x
h = p
x
hM
d
h . Using (4), (17) and (18) one
finds that Xcifh = Lhnp
x
hTh/ (1 + np
x
hTh) , and ∂X
cif
h /∂Th < 0.
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4 Numerical exercise at the industry level
In this chapter, we use estimates of the key parameters of our model from the literature or
calibrate them according to the model. Since there is substantial cross-industry variation of
parameters, we do a separate analysis for 14 industries. The numerical exercise serves several
purposes. First, it allows to calibrate the degree of external economies of scale, ηh/ (σh − 1),
and the level of competitive disadvantage of importers, Th. Second, it enables us to check the
inequalities derived in the theoretical section of this paper and to empirically sort out the
ambiguous effects of different trade liberalization scenarios, industry by industry. Finally, the
exercise allows to compute the productivity gains (or losses) relative to status quo achieved by
setting Th = 1, i.e., to a situation, where technical requirements are harmonized.
4.1 Calibration
Several studies quantify the elasticity of substitution and productivity dispersion on industry
level for US and European data. However, we do not have estimates from a structural econo-
metric approach, in which σh and γh are separately identified under the relevant regularity
conditions that have to hold in the present theoretical framework.22
Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2007) estimate industry-level dispersion measures
γh using European data.23 Their estimates of γh are on average close to 2. Chaney (2007) shows
that elasticities of substitution obtained from standard gravity models are distorted under the
presence of heterogeneous firms. Therefore, we draw on estimates of the shape parameter of the
sales distribution ςh = γh− (σh − 1) obtained from Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) to back
out the values of σh given the estimates of γh.24 Our sources for ςh and γh both are consistent
with heterogeneous firm models and use the same European firm-level data (Amadeus). Since
ςh is close to 1 for all industries, the values of σh cluster around 2.25 Table 1 reports our findings
22For example, γh > σh − 1.
23They estimate firm-level productivities using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator, and fit a Pareto
distribution for each industry. For all industries the regression fit (the adjusted R squared) is close to 1.
24In other words: we take γh and ςh as data and calibrate σh.
25Our values of σh seem low; however, the are consistent with other estimates, e.g., those by Acemoglu and
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Table 1: Parameter description (preferred specification)
Data Calibration
Industry τh pxh ηh γh σh Th
ηh
σh−1
ηmin
σh−1
ηmax
σh−1
Chemicals 1.09 0.55 0.62 1.81 1.31 1.08 1.98 1.25 2.51
Rubber and plastics 1.12 0.44 0.7 2.37 2.51 1.42 0.46 0.26 0.52
Leather and footwear 1.09 0.26 0.63 2.35 2.51 2.08 0.42 0.26 0.52
Lumber and wood 1.15 0.12 0.56 2.45 2.55 3.07 0.36 0.25 0.5
Paper products 1.14 0.45 0.78 1.97 1.94 1.29 0.83 0.41 0.83
Textile 1.11 0.24 0.59 2.25 2.29 1.97 0.46 0.3 0.61
Apparel 1.09 0.24 0.59 1.8 1.91 1.89 0.64 0.43 0.85
Non-ferrous metals 1.06 0.53 0.71 2.21 1.87 1.23 0.82 0.45 0.9
Machinery except electrical 1.06 0.27 0.39 2.35 2.24 1.86 0.32 0.32 0.63
Electrical machinery 1.06 0.29 0.39 1.93 1.84 1.64 0.47 0.47 0.93
Road vehicles 1.1 0.33 0.55 2.06 1.35 1.17 1.56 1.11 2.22
Transport equipment 1.05 0.33 0.65 2.06 1.67 1.39 0.97 0.58 1.16
Scientific/measuring equip. 1.05 0.13 0.42 1.84 1.34 1.43 1.22 1.13 2.27
Optical/photographic equip. 1.05 0.13 0.42 1.84 1.5 1.69 0.83 0.77 1.55
Notes. τh from Hanson and Xiang (2004); ηh from Ardelean (2007). Th calibrated to meet export
participation rate pxh from Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz (2004). n calibrated to meet openness of 40%. σh
imputed from shape parameters estimated by Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2007) and sales
dispersion measures from Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
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for 14 sectors.26
Ardelean (2007) provides the first industry-level estimates of the parameter that governs the
external scale effect. She identifies ηh by decomposing the price index into a traditional part and
the extensive margin, following Feenstra (1994), and exploiting cross-importer variation. For
all industries, she rejects the standard assumption of ηh = 1. On average, her estimate of ηh is
0.58. Given the importance of this parameter, and the fact that the available estimates are for
the US (while our calibration targets Europe), we run three scenarios. (A) uses the estimates
found by Ardelean and allows for industry variation. (B) disallows for industry variation and
sets ηh for all industries to the lowest available estimate found in Ardelean ηmin. (C) is similar
to (B) but sets ηh = ηmax. Note that even in (B) and (C) the elasticity of Ah with respect to
input variety (ηh/ (σh − 1)) still exhibits industry-level variance.
We take data on industry transport costs from Hanson and Xiang (2004). Using data on
freight rates for U.S. imports from Feenstra (1996), they identify the implicit U.S. industry
freight rate (insurance and freight charges/import value), and regress it on log distance to the
origin country. Transport cost for an industry are reported as the projected industry freight
rate from these coefficient estimates evaluated at median distance in their sample of importers
and exporters.27
Finally, we calibrate the competitive disadvantage of importers Th such that the model
replicates the export participation rates pxh by industry reported by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2004) for European firms.28 Equation (13) shows that our choice of τh, γh and σh and the
observed values of pxh directly imply Th.
29 Our calibration yields values of Th varying between
1 and 3, in all industries strictly above unity (see Table 1). This finding is well in line with the
other calibration exercises in the literature, e.g., Ghironi and Melitz (2005). The calibration
Ventura (2002). We conduct some robustness analysis with respect to σh below.
26Table 4 in the Appendix reports how data organized in different industry classifications has been mapped
into our sectoral structure (which is essentially that of Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano, 2007).
27We are grateful to Gordon Hanson for providing those estimates.
28More specifically, their data is from France.
29We also use information on openness (40%), the average transportation costs, and the average Th to calibrate
the number of trading partners n.
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reveals interesting cross-industry variance in the incidence of fixed cost protection Th. The
chemical and transport equipment industries exhibit fairly low levels of Th, while leather and
footwear or apparel seem much more strongly protected.30
4.2 Sorting out the ambiguities
We may now use the results of our calibration exercise to check the inequalities derived in the
theoretical section of the paper. Our calibration yields Th > 1 in all industries. Hence, our
theoretical results imply that variable trade cost liberalization always leads to an increase in
average productivity and to a reduction in input diversity. Given that ηh < 1 for all industries,
the loss in input diversity has a modest negative impact on industry productivity Ah so that
the positive effect on the average productivity ϕ˜h dominates. In case of TBT reform, the results
presented in Table 1 do not suffice to sort out the ambiguities. Therefore, the following discussion
focuses on our two TBT liberalization scenarios. Table 2 answers whether industry productivity
Ah and its components (Mh, ϕ˜h) increase with TBT reform. The left panel discusses the case of
T-neutral deregulation, while the right panel looks at incremental mutual recognition.
T-neutral deregulation. We have shown analytically that T-neutral deregulation unambigu-
ously leads to a fall in average productivity ϕ˜h and to a rise in input diversity Mh. However,
the effect on industry productivity Ah is ambiguous and crucially depends on the elasticity of
Ah with respect to Mh relative to the dispersion measure γh (see Proposition 1). Allowing for
cross-industry variation in ηh, column (A) in the left panel of Table 2 shows that T-neutral
deregulation improves industry productivity in most of the industries, except for those where
industry externalities are unimportant due to a high value of σh (leather and footwear, lumber
and wood) or due to low values for ηh (machinery except electric, electric machinery). In con-
trast to column (A) , where industry values for ηh are used, in (B) the parameter ηh is set for
all industries to the minimum level ηmin found by Ardelean. In (C) it is set to the maximum
level ηmax. Not surprisingly, with (B) the outlook worsens, while it improves with (C). Hence,
30The literature mainly offers aggregate calibration exercises. We seem to be the first to run an industry-level
simulation.
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Table 2: Do industry productivity Ah and its components rise under TBT reform?
T-neutral deregulation Incremental mutual recognition
Increase in Increase in
Ah Ah Ah ϕ˜h Mh Ah Ah Ah
(A) (B) (C) – – (A) (B) (C)
Industry
Chemicals YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
Rubber and plastics YES NO YES NO YES YES NO YES
Leather and footwear NO NO YES NO YES YES NO YES
Lumber and wood NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Paper products YES NO YES NO YES YES NO YES
Textile YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Apparel YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Non-ferrous metals YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Machinery except electrical NO NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Electrical machinery NO NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Road vehicles YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Transport equipment YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
Scientific/equipm. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Optical/photographic equip. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. In scenario (A), the external scale parameter ηh varies across industries according to estimates
from Ardelean (2007). In scenario (B), ηh does not vary across industries and is set at the minimum value
found in the estimates. Scenario (C), uses the maximum value instead. Average productivity ϕ˜h and
input diversity Mh are not affected by ηh. In case of domestic deregulation, they respectively fall and rise
unambiguously. See Table 1 for further details on the specification.
whether T-neutral deregulation improves industry productivity crucially depends on the impor-
tance of scale economies. In our preferred setup (A) , the picture is mixed: some industries
benefit while others do not.
Incremental mutual recognition. For incremental mutual recognition, the effects on aver-
age productivity and input diversity are both ambiguous from a theoretical point of view (see
Lemmata 1 and 2) and depend on model parameters in a fairly complicated fashion. Table
2 shows that TBT reform improves input diversity in all industries. Regarding the effect on
average productivity, the picture is different. Incremental mutual recognition leads to realloca-
tion of resources from efficient incumbent exporters and inefficient domestic producers to new
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exporters. It turns out that the latter effect dominates the former one in most industries. In
line with condition (23), average productivity ϕ˜h only goes up for industries with low export
participation rates (lumber and wood, road vehicles, scientific/measuring equipment, and opti-
cal/photographic equipment). In those special cases, industry productivity rises regardless of
ηh.
In the other cases, the size of the scale effect is important again. Only if it is large enough does
the positive industry diversity effect offset the negative average productivity effect (see condition
(27)). Specification (A) , which exploits the industry variation in Ardelean’s estimates, shows
that industry productivity increases in all industries. This optimistic outlook materializes a
fortiori if ηh is set to ηmax. The picture is reversed for three industries (rubber and plastics,
leather and footwear, and paper products) if we use ηmin. Hence, we are fairly confident that
incremental mutual recognition indeed improves industry productivity.
4.3 Quantifying the effects of TBT reform: the case of harmonization
Rather than evaluating the sign of a marginal TBT reform, we now quantify the productivity
gains and losses associated to the harmonization of technical standards, i.e., to a reduction of
f˜x such that foreign firms face the same licensing costs than domestic firms. This scenario stops
short from full mutual recognition, since foreign firms still have to license their goods market by
market. More specifically, assume the domestic and foreign fixed distribution cost are identical.31
Then the comparative disadvantage of importers Th is only driven by differences in the regulatory
component. We simulate the effects of a discrete cut of Th to the level of harmonization, i.e. a
reduction to Th = 1. This scenario is technologically feasible for all industries since the sorting
condition τ1−σhh Th > 1 continues to hold, given any level of variable trade costs τh.
32
One could expect that industry productivity unambiguously rises. However, a prioiri this
31In the present model, this is a natural assumption since countries are symmetric.
32It may be feasible to reduce beyond harmonization and eliminate f˜xh such that Th goes below unity. However,
since we have no data on the components of fdh and f
x
h , we cannot calibrate the lowest feasible level of f¯
d
h . Also
note that our numerical analysis does not require calibration of feh or δh since those parameters drop out when
comparing equilibrium outcomes at Th = 1 to those obtained under the benchmark calibration.
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is not the case, since their are industry externalities at work. The decentralized equilibrium
does not necessarily feature the efficient industry diversity if ηh 6= 1.33 Neither do producers
internalize the effect of entry on the external economies of scale in the industry nor on the
profits of incumbent producers. If ηh < 1, there is over-supply of varieties, if ηh > 1 (which
is empirically implausible) there is under-supply. Only in the special case where ηh = 1 does
the planner solution coincide with the decentralized equilibrium. High regulatory costs reduce
entry and thereby mitigate the distortion due to external economies of scale. However, TBTs
are certainly not the first-best policy to cope with oversupply of varieties, since they do not
generate any income (unlike entry taxes).
Clearly, the cut to Th = 1 is tremendous for industries with a high degree of competitive
disadvantage of imports (lumber and wood) and relatively small for industries with low protec-
tion to start with (chemicals). In any case, the reduction in Th induces more firms to export,
thereby implying ∆%pxh > 0. Second, since less productive firms start to export, this comes
along with a deterioration of their average productivity level (∆%ϕ˜h < 0).34 Third, due to in-
creased competition the least productive input producers are forced to exit, thereby decreasing
the mass of firms operating domestically (∆%Mdh < 0). However, input diversity clearly rises
(∆%Mh > 0).35 The increase is relatively large in industries with high initial Th.
Finally, the total effect on industry productivity is dominated by the scale effect.36 The
increase is relatively large in industries with low value of σh (chemicals, road vehicles), and in
industries with a positive average productivity effect (scientific and measuring equipment, and
optical and photographic equipment). Table 3 summarizes the results.
33The welfare-theoretic results obtained by Benassy (1996) for arbitrary ηh and homogeneous firms continue to
hold in the presence of productivity heterogeneity.
34An exception are industries with a low fraction of exporters to start with (scientific and measuring equipment,
and optical and photographic equipment): there average productivity increases, overall leading to a large rise in
industry productivity.
35From a social planner’s perspective, there is over-supply of varieties also under T ∗h as ηh < 1. However, even
if ∆%Mh > 0, the over-supply of varieties relative to the planner’s solution is smaller for T
∗
h than for Th.
36An exception is the industry which features the lowest strength of external economies of scale effects (ma-
chinery except electrical).
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Table 3: Productivity gains and losses from harmonization (preferred specification)
Industry ∆%Th ∆%Mdh ∆%p
x
h ∆%ϕ˜h ∆%Mh ∆%Ah
Chemicals -7.2 -24.5 54.4 -2.3 5.7 9.0
Rubber and plastics -29.5 -14.3 73.0 -9.7 28.8 1.5
Leather and footwear -51.8 -26.9 211.9 -16.7 61.1 1.7
Lumber and wood -67.4 -37.3 488.2 -16.6 78.1 2.7
Paper products -22.6 -19.3 70.6 -8.3 20.2 6.8
Textile -49.3 -31.7 227.4 -14.9 53.2 3.4
Apparel -47.2 -37.5 253.1 -16.0 48.9 8.3
Non-ferrous metals -18.5 -22.1 68.2 -6.0 16.4 6.4
Machinery except electrical -46.3 -34.8 225.7 -13.3 49.4 -1.6
Electrical machinery -39.1 -39.1 214.7 -11.9 37.7 2.3
Road vehicles -14.6 -43.0 151.4 -1.3 10.6 15.5
Transport equipment -27.9 -40.2 173.1 -6.9 24.1 14.7
Scientific/measuring equip. -30.2 -65.0 588.9 11.1 17.3 35.0
Optical/photographic equip. -40.9 -61.8 586.7 3.8 27.7 27.2
Notes. In this scenario, we compare status quo industry productivity with the level that would
obtain if regulatory fixed market access costs where as low for foreign firms than for domestic ones.
∆%x = ∆x/x ∗ 100. See Table 1 for further details.
4.4 Robustness
In our preferred calibration, we have avoided to draw on industry estimates of the elasticity
of substitution σh which are derived in standard homogeneous-firms gravity models. As a
robustness check we use data on σh from Hanson and Xiang (2004) (for the U.S.). We invert the
logic in the above calibration, and now treat σh and ςh as data. This allows to back out values
of γh that are consistent with the theoretical model. Given that the estimates of σh in Hanson
and Xiang are much larger than the ones derived under our preferred specification, we call this
robustness check high-σh specification. Table 6 in the Appendix summarizes the parameters.37
The major difference with respect to our preferred specification is that the elasticity of Ah with
respect to Mh, i.e., ηh/ (σh − 1) is now much smaller since the values of σh are much bigger.
Table 7 in the Appendix reports the results for the local analysis. Regarding T-neutral
deregulation, the negative diversity effect now dominates the positive average productivity ef-
37The number of symmetric trading partners n is calibrated to generate a trade openness of 40%.
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fect. Allowing for industry variation in ηh (column (A)), only the paper industry features an
improvement in industry productivity. Setting ηh to ηmin for all industries obviously darkens
the picture even further. Setting ηh to ηmax, in turn, only leads to a faint improvement: now
benefiting industries include the chemical and wood industries along with the paper industry.
The results for the incremental mutual recognition scenario change, too. While it is still true
that input diversity goes up in all industries, average productivity falls everywhere. Allowing
for industry variation in ηh, the overall effect on industry productivity is negative, except for
the wood and paper industries. If ηh is set to ηmin, the effect is negative for all industries. Using
instead ηmax, the picture brightens up slightly with about half of all industries experiencing
positive productivity effects.
The calibration of σh also drives the quantitative effects of TBT reform. While in terms
of average productivity and input diversity the picture is quite the same as compared to our
preferred specification38, the scale effect is large enough to slightly overcompensate the loss in
average productivity only for the industry with the highest strength of external economies of
scale (paper products).
Given the model and the available data, the quantitative analysis of the productivity effects
of TBT reform remains somewhat inconclusive. The reason is that estimates of σh found in
the literature vary widely. However, those estimates are crucial for pinning down the overall
productivity effects. Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007) also document strong sensitivity
of results with respect to this elasticity, albeit in a homogeneous goods open-macro model.
We believe that our preferred specification has key advantages over the strategy chosen in the
robustness checks, since it is fully consistent with our heterogeneous firms setup. However, we
will only be able to provide a definitive answer on the productivity effects of TBT reform once
structural estimates of σh and γh are available.
38An exception is that all industries face a deterioration of average productivity.
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5 Discussion and conclusions
5.1 Discussion
The present model highlights the input diversity and the average productivity effects of TBT
reform. These two channels are thought of great interest in recent trade models. However, TBT
deregulation can affect outcomes also through additional channels.
Resource saving effect. One may expect a direct resource saving effect of lower regulatory
costs which may increase the amount of final output per worker in the industry. However, in
our model, the resource-saving effect is exactly offset by additional entry so that TBT does not
affect productivity through this channel. To see this, let Fh denote sector-h specific resources39
devoted to fixed costs of entry feh, fixed domestic costs f
d
h , and fixed foreign market costs f
x
h .
Making use of the stationarity condition (17) and the free entry condition (15), one obtains
Fh = Lh/σh. Hence, irrespectively of the absolute size of feh,f
d
h , and f
x
h , a constant share of the
industry-specific labor force is used for the payment of fixed costs.40 The result is summarized
in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 In a stationary equilibrium, the number of workers devoted to fixed costs of entry,
domestic regulation, and fixed costs associated with the foreign market is a constant share 1/σh
of the industry-specific labor force.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Pro-competitive productivity gains. Additional entry may reduce the dead-weight loss as-
sociated to the existence of monopoly power. In our framework with constant elasticity of substi-
tution between varieties, markups are constant and TBT reform does not lead to pro-competitive
39Recall: by choice of numeraire, wh = 1.
40This result is specific to the CES production function but holds for general productivity distributions. Also,
it hinges on free entry of firms. In the Chaney (2007) model, where the number of potential producers is fixed,
there would be a resource saving effect. By allowing for free entry, the present paper takes a long-run perspective.
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productivity gains. The paper of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) addresses pro-competitive effects
with heterogeneous firms in a model with a linear demand system. However, in that framework,
there is no natural role for fixed foreign market access costs (and hence TBT as defined in our
paper), since the partitioning of firms into exporters and domestic sellers is achieved by the
structure of demand.
Between-industry reallocation. TBT reform potentially induces not only within-industry
resource reallocation, but also reallocation between industries. This would require a theoret-
ical framework like the one proposed by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007). However, in
that model analytical results are hard to obtain, even for simple setups and with the Pareto
assumption. This makes our task of ‘sorting out’ the intricacies unfeasible. Thus, we have based
our analysis on the Melitz framework and relegate the (worthwhile) computational analysis of
between-industry reallocation effects to future research.
Learning-by-exporting. Knowledge spillovers from international buyers and competitors
may improve the productivity of exporters. The so-called learning-by-exporting hypothesis has
been subject of intense empirical research, but has not encountered robust empirical support
so far (see the survey by Wagner, 2007). This is why we have refrained from modeling a link
between a firm’s export status and its productivity.
5.2 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the reallocation and industry productivity effects of technical barriers to
trade (TBT) reform in a single market with heterogeneous firms and variable and fixed trade
costs. The model goes beyond existing versions of the Melitz (2003) model by explicitly pa-
rameterizing external scale effects. Our framework allows to disentangle the effect of a TBT
reform on average productivity of input producers ϕ˜h and input diversity Mh, thereby making
the industry productivity effect dependent on the strength of external economies of scale.
We find that – under the parameter constellations obtained in our industry-level calibra-
tion exercise – lower TBTs lead to reallocation of market shares from more to less productive
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firms, potentially negatively affecting industry productivity for a wide range of parameter con-
stellations. However, input diversity usually goes up: To the danger of oversimplification, the
aggregate industry-level productivity effect is positive whenever the externality linked to input
diversity is strong enough. Our calibration exercise shows that this is indeed the case for all
industries. The aggregate effect, however, is sensitive to details of the calibration, while the
adverse effect on the productivity of the average firm is fairly robust.
Our analysis has a number of interesting implications: First, while variable trade cost and
TBT liberalization both increase the openness of industries, the relation between openness
and productivity is unclear. This may rationalize existing empirical results. Second, whether
reductions in variable trade costs improve aggregate productivity depends on the level of TBTs.
This interdependence calls for an integrative approach in trade policy. Third, our analysis
suggests that TBT reform typically is harder to achieve politically than tariff reform. The
reason is that, under a range of parameter constellations, existing exporters would lose market
share from lower TBTs but gain from lower variable trade costs.
The present paper suggests an array of interesting extensions. First, we have studies a model
of symmetric countries. This is probably defendable on grounds of carving out the general driving
forces and sorting out the ambiguities. For a relevant analysis of trade policy, however, a model
with asymmetric countries is needed. However, whenever the number of countries goes beyond
two, analytical results become hard to come by.
Second, we have treated trade costs as exogenous. It would be interesting to study the
strategic setting of TBTs in an asymmetric two-country model. A key challenge is how to deal
with the complex adjustment dynamics, that we have ignored in the present model, but which
are probably important in any political-economy analysis.
Third, given the ambiguous effects of different types of trade liberalization on aggregate pro-
ductivity, better estimates of the key parameters governing the model would be highly welcome.
This calls for structural estimation and identification of the key parameters in trade models
with heterogeneous firms: the shape parameter, the elasticity of substitution, and the degree of
external economies of scale.
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A Data description and robustness checks
Industry concordance. For calibration, we use data from different sources categorized at
different industry classifications. We therefore propose a concordance to map the several vari-
ables of interest into a unique industry classification (see Table 5). If two categories of the source
classification fall into one class of our classification, we compute the mean, in case of more than
two, we use the median.41
Table 4: Industry concordance
Parameter(s) γ ηh ςh τh, σh pxh
Industry Ottaviano HS BEA SITC SIC
Chemicals 9 28-31 281,283,284,287 51-56 28
Rubber and plastics 10 39 305,308 57,58 30
Leather and footwear 4 64 310 61,85 31
Lumber and wood 5 45 240 63 24
Paper products 6 48 262, 265 64 26
Textile 2 50-52 220 65 22
Apparel 3 61,62 230 84 23
Non-ferrous metals 12 74-81 335 68 33
Machinery except electrical 14 84 354 73 35
Electrical machinery 15 84 351-353,355-366 71,72,74-77 35,36
Road vehicles 17 87 371 78 37
Transport equipment 17 86,88 379 79 37
Scientific/measuring equip. 16 90,91 381 87 38
Optical/photographic equip. 16 90,91 386 88 38
Industry sales dispersion. The industry sales dispersion measure is obtained from Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). Using data on European firms from the Amadeus database for 1994,
they compute the standard deviation of the logarithm of firm sales, which – given the Pareto
assumption – is equivalent to ςh = γh − (σh − 1) ; see Table 6.
41We have also tried the mean throughout, which yields identical results.
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Table 5: Industry sales dispersion
Industry ςh
Chemicals 1.5
Rubber and plastics 0.86
Leather and footwear 0.84
Lumber and wood 0.9
Paper products 1.03
Textile 0.96
Apparel 0.89
Non-ferrous metals 1.34
Machinery except electrical 1.11
Electrical machinery 1.1
Road vehicles 1.71
Transport equipment 1.39
Scientific and measuring equipment 1.5
Optical and photographic equipment 1.34
Table 6: Parameter description (high-σh specification)
Data Calibration
Industry τh pxh ηh σh γh Th
ηh
σh−1
ηmin
σh−1
ηmax
σh−1
Chemicals 1.09 0.55 0.62 5.94 6.44 1.03 0.12 0.08 0.16
Rubber and plastics 1.12 0.44 0.7 5.8 5.66 1.16 0.15 0.08 0.16
Leather and footwear 1.09 0.26 0.63 8.07 7.91 1.82 0.09 0.06 0.11
Lumber and wood 1.15 0.12 0.56 3.99 3.89 3.35 0.19 0.13 0.26
Paper products 1.14 0.45 0.78 4.25 4.28 1.19 0.24 0.12 0.24
Textile 1.11 0.24 0.59 7.82 7.78 1.7 0.09 0.06 0.11
Apparel 1.09 0.24 0.59 5.61 5.5 2.18 0.13 0.08 0.17
Non-ferrous metals 1.06 0.53 0.71 6.66 7 1.24 0.13 0.07 0.14
Machinery except electrical 1.06 0.27 0.39 8.09 8.2 2.07 0.06 0.06 0.11
Electrical machinery 1.06 0.29 0.39 8.2 8.29 1.98 0.05 0.05 0.11
Road vehicles 1.1 0.33 0.55 7.11 7.82 1.36 0.09 0.06 0.13
Transport equipment 1.05 0.33 0.65 7.4 7.79 1.79 0.1 0.06 0.12
Scientific/measuring equip. 1.05 0.13 0.42 6.72 7.22 3.77 0.07 0.07 0.14
Optical/photographic equip. 1.05 0.13 0.42 8.13 8.47 3.85 0.06 0.05 0.11
Notes. σh and τh from Hanson and Xiang (2004); ηh from Ardelean (2006). Th calibrated to meet export
participation rate pxh from Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz (2004). n calibrated to meet openness of 40%. γh
computed from ς using σh from Hanson and Xiang.
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Table 7: Do industry productivity Ah and its components rise under TBT reform?
(High σh specification)
T-neutral deregulation Incremental mutual recognition
Increase in Increase in
Ah Ah Ah ϕ˜h Mh Ah Ah Ah
(A) (B) (C) – – (A) (B) (C)
Industry
Chemicals NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES
Rubber and plastics NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Leather and footwear NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Lumber and wood NO NO YES NO YES YES NO YES
Paper products YES NO YES NO YES YES NO YES
Textile NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Apparel NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES
Non-ferrous metals NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Machinery except electrical NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Electrical machinery NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Road vehicles NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES
Transport equipment NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES
Scientific/measuring equip. NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES
Optical/photographic equip. NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes. In scenarios (A), the external scale parameter ηh varies across industries according to estimates
from Ardelean (2007). In scenario (B) ηh does not vary across industries and is set at the minimum value
found in the estimates. Scenario (C) uses the maximum value instead. Average productivity ϕ˜h and
input diversity Mh are not affected by ηh. In case of domestic deregulation, they respectively fall and rise
unambiguously. See Table 1 for further details on the specification.
B Guide to calculations
B.1 Theoretical framework
Export cutoff productivity. Evaluating (5) and (6) at ϕ∗h and (ϕ
∗
h)
x and solving for rdh
respectively yields rdh (ϕ
∗
h) = σhf
d
h and r
d
h [(ϕ
∗
h)
x] = σhfdhτ
σh−1
h Th. Divding r
d
h (ϕ
∗
h) and r
d
h [(ϕ
∗
h)
x]
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Table 8: Productivity gains and losses from harmonization (high-σh specification)
Industry ∆%Th ∆%Mdh ∆%p
x
h ∆%ϕ˜h ∆%Mh ∆%Ah
Chemicals -2.6 -0.6 3.5 -0.3 1.8 -0.1
Rubber and plastics -14.1 -1.8 19.6 -1.7 10.5 -0.3
Leather and footwear -44.9 -4.6 94.9 -4.3 41.8 -1.2
Lumber and wood -70.1 -21.4 382.0 -12.1 76.6 -2.2
Paper products -16.1 -3.7 26.0 -2.7 12.4 0.1
Textile -41.0 -4.6 82.7 -3.6 34.2 -1.2
Apparel -54.2 -9.9 153.7 -7.7 58.0 -2.2
Non-ferrous metals -19.1 -3.6 29.9 -2.1 16.0 -0.2
Machinery except electrical -51.7 -7.7 131.9 -5.1 55.3 -2.8
Electrical machinery -49.5 -7.1 119.9 -4.8 52.3 -2.6
Road vehicles -26.4 -5.4 48.0 -2.3 20.4 -0.6
Transport equipment -44.1 -8.6 102.9 -4.5 44.8 -0.9
Scientific/equip. -73.5 -21.7 433.8 -8.0 96.2 -3.4
Optical/photographic equip. -74.0 -16.2 395.7 -7.3 98.9 -3.4
Notes. ∆%x = ∆x/x ∗ 100. See Table 1 for further details.
using (4) then leads to expression (11)
rdh (ϕ
∗
h)
rdh
[(
ϕ∗h
)x] =
(
ϕ∗h(
ϕ∗h
)x
)σh−1
=
σhf
d
h
σhf
d
hτ
σh−1
h Th
⇒ (ϕ∗h)x = ϕ∗hτhT
1
σh−1
h
Average sales-weighted productivity level of domestically produced inputs. Under
Pareto, the average sales-weighted productivity level of domestically produced inputs (7) is given
by
(
ϕ˜dh
)σh−1
=
1
1−G (ϕ∗h)
∞∫
ϕ∗h
ϕσh−1gh (ϕ) dϕ (31)
= γh (ϕ
∗
h)
γh
∞∫
ϕ∗h
ϕσh−γh−2dϕ
=
γh
γh − (σh − 1)
(ϕ∗h)
σh−1 .
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Average sales-weighted productivity level of imported inputs. Correspondingly, under
Pareto the average sales-weighted productivity level of imported components is
(ϕ˜xh)
σh−1 =
1
1−G [(ϕxh)∗]
∞∫
(ϕxh)
∗
(ϕ)σh−1 gh (ϕ) dϕ (32)
=
γh
γh − (σh − 1)
[(ϕxh)
∗]σh−1 :
Plugging in the entry cutoff productivity level (11) and recalling (31), we find that (ϕ˜xh)
σh−1 =
τhT
1
σh−1
h ϕ˜
d
h.
Average sales-weighted productivity of inputs Plugging in (12) into (14), and using
Mh = (1 + npxh)M
d
h , we obtain the following expression
(ϕ˜h)
σh−1 =
1
Mh
[
Mdh
(
ϕ˜dh
)σh−1
+ nMxh
(
τ−1ϕ˜xh
)σh−1] (33)
=
1
1 + npxh
[(
ϕ˜dh
)σh−1
+ npxh
(
τ−1ϕ˜xh
)σh−1]
=
1 + npxhT
1 + npxh
[(
ϕ˜dh
)]σh−1
. (34)
Average profit. By using (5), (6), (7), and (12) we can compute average profits.
p¯ih = pidh
(
ϕ˜dh
)
+ npxhpi
x
h (ϕ˜
x
h) (35)
=
rdh
(
ϕ˜dh
)
σh
− fdh + npxh
(
τ1−σhh r
d
h (ϕ˜
x
h)
σh
− fxh
)
= fdh
[(
ϕ˜dh
ϕ∗h
)σh−1
− 1
]
+ npxhf
d
h
(τ−1h ϕ˜xh
ϕ∗h
)σh−1
− Th

= fdh
σh − 1
γh − (σh − 1)
+ npxhf
x
h
σh − 1
γh − (σh − 1)
= fdh
σh − 1
γh − (σh − 1)
(1 + npxhTh) . (36)
Given equation (13), the average profit line is horizontal in the (p¯ih, ϕ∗h)−space.
Entry cutoff productivity level. Plugging in (36) and pinh = (ϕ
∗
h)
−γh into the free entry
condition (15), and using pinh = (ϕ
∗
h)
−γh and (13), one can solve for the entry productivity cutoff
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level
fehδh
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ0h
)γh
= fdh
(
σh − 1
γh − (σh − 1)
)σh−1
[1 + nτpxhT ]
⇔ ϕ∗h =
{
σh − 1
γh − (σh − 1)
fdh
fehδh
[1 + nτpxhT ]
} 1
γh
.
Input diversity. Recall that rdh (ϕ
∗
h) = σhf
d
h . It follows from (4) that r
d
h (ϕ) =
(
ϕ
ϕ∗h
)σh−1
σhfd.
Evaluating rd at ϕ˜h, and using Rh = Lh, input diversity is given by
Mh =
Rh
rd (ϕ˜h)
=
Lh
σhf
d
h
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ˜h
)σh−1
.
Price index. By inserting optimal pricing of monopolists and the definition of average pro-
ductivity (8) in the definition of the price index (3) we obtain
Ph = M
− ηh
σh−1
h p (ϕ˜h) (37)
= M
− ηh
σh−1
h /ρϕ˜h. (38)
B.2 Industry productivity effects of TBT reforms
B.2.1 T-neutral deregulation
Entry cutoff level. Differentiating the entry cutoff level (16) with respect to fdh , holding
everthing else constant, we obtain
ϕˆ∗h/fˆ
d
h = 1/γh.
Export cutoff level. From equation (11) it can immediately seen that
(̂
ϕxh
)∗
/fˆdh = ϕˆ
∗
h/fˆ
d
h
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Average productivity. It follows from (14) along with (7) that average productivity changes
according to ̂˜ϕh/fˆdh = ̂˜ϕdh/fˆdh = ϕˆ∗h/fˆdh .
Industry productivity. Plugging ϕˆ∗h/fˆdh into (19), we find
Aˆh
fˆdh
= −
(
ηh
σh − 1 −
1
γh
)
.
B.2.2 Incremental mutual recognition
Entry cutoff level From totally differentiating (16) one obtains
ϕˆ∗h
Tˆh
= −γh − (σh − 1)
γh (σh − 1)
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
. (39)
Export cutoff level Totall differentiating (11) and using (39) yields(̂
ϕxh
)∗
Tˆh
=
ϕˆ∗h
Tˆh
+
1
σh − 1
=
1
σh − 1
[
1− γh − (σh − 1)
γh
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
]
.
Since [γh − (σh − 1)] /γh < 1 and npxhTh/ (1 + npxhTh) , we have
(̂
ϕxh
)∗
/Tˆh > 0.
Fraction of exporters. Differentiating (13) with respect to Th, we obtain
pˆxh
Tˆh
= − γh
σh − 1 . (40)
Average productivity of domestic producers. It follows from (7) that
̂˜ϕdh
Tˆh
=
ϕˆ∗h
Tˆh
. (41)
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Average productivity. Differentiating (14), we obtain
̂˜ϕh
Tˆh
=
̂˜ϕdh
Tˆh
+
1
σh − 1
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
pˆxh
Tˆh
Th − 1
Th
1
1 + npxh
+ 1
)
.
Using (40), (41), and (39), we get
̂˜ϕh
Tˆh
=
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
1
γh
− γh
(σh − 1)2
Th − 1
Th
1
1 + npxh
)
. (42)
Then ̂˜ϕh
Tˆh
< 0⇔ 1
γ2h
<
1
γ2
h
=
1
(σh − 1)2
Th − 1
Th
1
1 + npxh
,
which can never hold if Th < 1.
Input diversity. From inserting (39) and (42) into Mˆh/Tˆh = (σh − 1)
(̂˜ϕh/Tˆh − ̂˜ϕh/Tˆh), we
get
Mˆh
Tˆh
=
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
1
1 + npxh
− 1
)
. (43)
Then
Mˆh
Tˆh
< 0⇔ 1
γh
>
1
γ¯h
=
1
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
1
1 + npxh
,
which always holds if Th < 1.
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Industry productivity. Plugging (43) and (42) into (19), we have
Aˆh
Tˆh
=
1
σh − 1
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh (ηh − 1) +
σh − 1− ηhγh
γh
)
=
1
σh − 1
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
((
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh − 1
)
ηh −
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh +
σh − 1
γh
)
=
1
σh − 1
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh − 1
)(
ηh −
γh
σh−1
Th−1
Th
θh − σh−1γh
γh
σh−1
Th−1
Th
θh − 1
)
=
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh − 1
)(
ηh
σh − 1 −
1
σh − 1
γh
σh−1
Th−1
Th
θh − σh−1γh
γh
σh−1
Th−1
Th
θh − 1
)
=
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh − 1
)(
ηh
σh − 1 −
1
σh − 1
γh
γ¯h
− σh−1γh
γh
γ¯h
− 1
)
=
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh − 1
)(
ηh
σh − 1 −
1
σh − 1
γh − γ¯hγh (σh − 1)
γh − γ¯h
)
=
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh − 1
)(
ηh
σh − 1 −
γh
σh−1 −
γ¯h
γh
γh − γ¯h
)
=
npxhTh
1 + npxhTh
(
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
θh − 1
)(
ηh
σh − 1 − υ
∗
h
)
Then
Aˆh/Tˆh < 0⇔

γ¯h > γh > γh
γh < γh and
ηh
σh−1 > υ
∗
h
γh > γ¯h and
ηh
σh−1 < υ
∗
h
B.2.3 Comparing tariff and TBT liberalization
Entry cutoff productivity. From totally differentiating (16) one obtains
ϕˆ∗h
τˆh
= − np
x
hTh
1 + npxhTh
< 0.
Export cutoff level Accordingly, totally differentiating (11) yields(̂
ϕxh
)∗
τˆh
=
ϕˆ∗h
τˆh
+ 1
=
1
1 + npxhTh
> 0.
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Fraction of exporters. From differentiating (13) we obtain
pˆxh
τˆh
= −γh. (44)
Average productivity. From totally differentiating (14) we obtain
̂˜ϕh
τˆh
=
̂˜ϕdh
τˆh
− γh
σh − 1
npxh
1 + npxh
Th − 1
1 + npxhT
,
where we have used (44). Using (7), we see that ̂˜ϕdh/τˆh = ϕ̂∗h/τˆh. Then totally differentiating
(16) and (14) yields respectively
ϕ̂∗h
τˆh
= − np
x
hTh
1 + npxhTh
(45)
and ̂˜ϕh
τˆh
= − np
x
hTh
1 + npxhTh
(
1 +
γh
σh − 1
1
1 + npxh
Th − 1
Th
)
. (46)
Then ̂˜ϕh
τˆh
< 0⇔ 1
γh
> − 1
σh − 1
1
1 + npxh
Th − 1
Th
.
Input diversity. From totally differentiating (18), we get
M̂h
τˆh
= (σh − 1)
(
ϕ̂∗h
τˆh
−
̂˜ϕh
τˆh
)
.
Plugging in (45) and (46) yields
M̂h
τˆh
=
γh (Th − 1)
1 + npxhTh
npxh
1 + npxh
. (47)
Industry productivity. Inserting (46) and (47) into (19) yields
Aˆh
τˆh
< 0⇔ ηh
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
1
1 + npxh
< 1 +
γh
σh − 1
Th − 1
Th
1
1 + npxh
. (48)
Let ψ∗h ≡ 1σh−1 + 1γh
Th
Th−1 (1 + np
x
h) . Then condition (48) implies ηh/ (σh − 1) < ψ∗h for Th > 1
and ηh/ (σh − 1) > ψ∗h for Th < 1 respectively.
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B.2.4 Discussion
Resource saving effect. Using the free entry condition (15), the stationarity condition (17),
and the expression for average profits (36), the total amount of labor devoted to fixed costs is
given by
Fh = Mdhf
d
h + nM
x
hf
x
h +M
e
hf
e
h
= Mdhf
d
h (1 + np
x
hTh) +
pinh
δh
p¯ihM
e
h
= Mdhf
d
h (1 + np
x
hTh) + p¯ihM
d
h
= fdhM
d
h
(
1 + npxhTh + p¯ih/f
d
h
)
= fdhM
d
h
(
1 + npxhTh +
σh − 1
γh − (σh − 1)
(1 + npxhTh)
)
= fdhM
d
h (1 + np
x
hTh)
γh
γh − (σh − 1)
Dividing both sides by Rh, usingMh =Mdh (1 + np
x
h) , plugging in the expression for r
d evaluated
at ϕ˜h into the expression for input diversity, and using the expressions for average productivity
(14) and (7), we find that a fixed share of aggregate revenues is devoted to the payment of fixed
costs.is actually constant
Fh
Rh
=
1
σh
1 + npxhTh
1 + npxh
γh
γh − (σh − 1)
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ˜h
)σh−1
=
1
σh
1 + npxhTh
1 + npxh
γh
γh − (σh − 1)
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ˜h
)σh−1 1 + npxh
1 + npxhT
γh − (σh − 1)
γh
=
1
σh
.
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